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Do mutual funds herd in industries?Umut Celikera,b,1t Jaideep Chowdhuryc,2, Gokhan Sonaerd,*
1. Introduction
Herding is commonly defined as the similarities in trading of a 
group of market participants. Previous studies propose two main 
micro-level herding measures to examine evidence of herding of 
a group of market participants.3 Lakonishok et al. (1992, hereafter 
LSV) construct a herding measure that detects quarterly imbalances 
in the number of buyers and sellers from a particular group in spe- 
cific stocks while Sias (2004, hereafter Sias) proposes a measure that 
quantifies the degree to which such imbalances tend to persist over 
adjacent quarters. In this paper, we use the two herding measures to
investigate whether mutual funds herd in industries and the possible 
effects of such behavior on industry returns.
The extant literature provide mixed evidence of herding using 
either one of the two proposed herding measures. LSV report weak 
evidence of herding by pension funds in individual stocks and find 
no evidence that such herding has a destabilizing effect on stock 
prices. Likewise, Grinblatt et al. (1995, hereafter GTW) use the 
LSV measure to examine mutual fund herding in individual stocks 
and report weak herding levels. Wermers (1999) carries out a sim- 
ilar analysis on a larger sample of mutual funds and finds similar 
evidence of herding. In addition, he documents that stocks that 
are subjected to buy herding outperform stocks that are subjected 
to sell herding both in the herding quarter and in the following two 
quarters. Sias uses his above mentioned alternative herding mea- 
sure and finds strong evidence of herding by institutions in individ- 
ual stocks.
The above surveyed studies focus on stock herding and on the 
effect that such herding may have on the returns of stocks. Differ­
ent from the above literature, a related recent study by Choi and 
Sias (2009) investigates industry herding by institutional investors. 
They provide several justifications for their focus on herding at the 
industry level. They first contend that the reasons that may moti­
vate institutions to herd in individual stocks may also lead them
to herd at the industry level.4 Second, they cite evidence in the lit- 
erature that information is not incorporated simultaneously in the 
prices of all stocks in the same industry, and that investors can 
therefore infer information about a given stock from other stocks 
in the same industry.5 Employing the Sias measure Choi and Sias 
(2009) find high levels of industry herding by institutional investors 
but document only weak evidence that industries that are subjected 
to high levels of herding exhibit subsequent price reversals.
This study examines whether mutual funds herd in industries 
and the extent to which such herding impacts industry valuations. 
Although this study shares a similar motivation to that offered by 
Choi and Sias (2009) in investigating herding in industries, it 
focuses on herding by mutual funds rather than institutions.6 The 
focus on mutual funds is motivated by the following reasons. First, 
it is well documented that mutual funds have tendencies to follow 
certain behavioral patterns that might result in herding. Specifically, 
previous studies show that mutual funds tend to chase certain char- 
acteristics (Falkenstein, 1996), mimic the trades of other funds with 
good performance (Friend et al., 1970), trade due to reputational 
concerns (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999), and trade on the same new 
information (Brown et al., 2014). These types of behaviors may also 
drive mutual funds to herd in industries. Second, there are data 
related advantages of focusing on mutual funds rather than focusing 
on all institutions. Institutional holdings data (13-F filings) are 
reported at the fund family level whereas Thomson-Reuters Mutual 
Fund holdings data are available at the fund level. Using the latter 
we can filter out index funds and sector funds from our sample. In 
addition, a fund family can be comprised of funds that trade with 
the herd, against the herd, and/or independently. Mutual funds hold- 
ings database enables us to detect these differences in trading 
behaviors of individual funds belonging to the same fund family.
To investigate whether mutual funds herd in industries, this 
study employs both the LSV and the Sias herding measures. The 
LSV measure, as applied to industries, quantifies the imbalance 
between the number of buyers and sellers from a particular inves- 
tor group in a specific industry during a given quarter. In contrast, 
the Sias measure quantifies the degree to which members of an 
investor group (mutual funds in our study) follow each other’s 
industry trades in adjacent quarters. Using the LSV measure we 
find that the level of industry herding by mutual funds is statisti- 
cally significant for the 1980-2013 period. Using the alternative 
Sias measure we find strong evidence of industry herding by 
mutual funds. As an additional test we use simulations to show 
that industry herding by mutual funds is significantly greater than 
that is expected by chance.
We also examine whether investors’ fund flows drive industry 
herding and find evidence of industry herding even after control­
ling for fund flows. Our findings also indicate that the reported 
industry herding is neither a manifestation of individual stock 
herding nor is it driven by style investing. We report slightly higher 
levels of industry herding during the internet bubble and bust 
period and find weak evidence of higher sell herding after 
high investor sentiment periods. We also explore the effect of 
industry conditions on industry herding and find evidence that 
industries with high past industry returns and high volatility levels
experience higher levels of buy herding by mutual funds in the 
subsequent period.
In line with the previous studies, we also examine whether 
industry herding by mutual funds affects industry returns. We find 
strong positive contemporaneous relationship between industry 
herding by mutual funds and industry returns. Industries that are 
subjected to buy herding by mutual funds outperform industries 
that are subjected to sell herding in the herding quarter(s). We find 
no evidence of return reversals for these industries in the periods 
following the herding, thus concluding that mutual fund herding 
in industries does not drive industry values away from their 
fundamentals.
Finally, we document that industry momentum, which is first 
documented by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and analyzed 
extensively in the follow-up studies, is closely related to herding 
of mutual funds in industries. Specifically, we provide evidence 
that industry momentum profits, over the first six months of the 
year after formation of winner and loser industry portfolios, are 
strongly positively related to the level of herding experience by 
industries during the formation period. Importantly, the industry 
momentum portfolio return difference between low- and high- 
herding industries can be completely attributed to the overperfor- 
mance of winner industries that are subjected to high levels of 
herding. We further show that high herding winner industries do 
not experience reversals in the subsequent periods providing evi- 
dence for the notion that herding shortens the duration of the 
underreaction period to good news, but does not result in the 
destabilization of prices.
This paper makes contribution to two strands of literature. First, 
it compliments the recent herding literature by documenting evi­
dence of industry herding by mutual funds. Our results are robust 
to investor fund flows, are not motivated by individual stock herd­
ing and are also not driven by chance. Second, we add to the extant 
literature on momentum. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) report 
that past winner industries outperform past loser industries in 
the subsequent six to twelve month holding period. We show that 
industry momentum is related to industry herding by mutual 
funds.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes the data. Section 3 explains the methodology. Sections 
4-6 present the empirical evidence and discuss the results. Sec­
tion 7 includes our concluding remarks.
2. Data
To compute industry herding measures we merge the Thom­
son-Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database with the monthly 
stock files of CRSP. The Thomson-Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings 
database is merged with the CRSP Mutual Fund database using 
MFLINKS database.
Our sample consists of all funds in Thomson-Reuters Mutual 
Fund Holdings database excluding all international funds and 
non-equity funds over the 1980-2013 period. We use Thomson- 
Reuters classification to identify funds’ investment objectives. 
Thomson-Reuters classification for investment objectives are as 
follows: 1-International, 2-aggressive growth, 3-growth, 4- 
growth-income, 5-municipal bonds, 6-bond and preferred, 7-bal- 
anced, 8-metals and 9-unclassified. To focus on actively managed 
diversified equity funds we only include funds with investment 
objective classification codes 2, 3 and 4 and also exclude all index 
and sector funds.' We use CRSP Mutual Funds Database fund style
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the mutual fund holdings database.
Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Panel A. Number and assets of mutual funds 
Number of mutual funds 423 496 797 2235 2423 1820 1377
Mean TNA (in million $) 123,467 236,812 263,423 538,967 1,290,868 1,872,231 2,522,763
Median TNA (in million $) 38,100 84,110 70,320 99,630 222,130 382,285 419,290
Panel B. Asset allocation of mutual funds
Mean ratio of CRSP stocks by value 83.507% 83.343% 78.997% 78.788% 81.673% 81.671% 78.966%
Median ratio of CRSP stocks by value 87.429% 86.345% 83.798% 89.277% 93.795% 92.026% 86.461%
In this table key statistics at five year intervals are presented for the Thomson-Reuters mutual fund holdings database. Mutual funds with investment objectives other than 2- 
aggressive growth, 3-growth, and 4-growth-income are excluded. For each column, statistics are shown below the listed year. Panel A reports the number of funds as well as 
the mean and median total net assets (in million $) of mutual funds. Panel B documents the mean and median ratios of the total value of CRSP stocks holdings to total assets of 
mutual funds.
codes to identify index and sector funds. Panel A of Table 1 presents 
the number of funds as well as the mean and median assets of 
mutual funds over the sample period (1980-2013).
Thomson-Reuters provide mutual fund holdings and the date 
for which these holdings are valid (report date, RDATE). For most 
funds the holdings information is available at the end of each quar- 
ter on this database. However, for some funds there are quarters 
for which this information is missing. In this paper, we include 
observations with adjacent fund-stock-quarter observations.
Another complication with the Thomson-Reuters Mutual Hold- 
ings database is that there are fund holdings data for a date prior to 
the end-of-quarter. We consider such reports to be as of the end of 
the respective quarter following Wermers (1999). In addition, for 
occasional cases where there are more than one report dates per 
quarter, we only include the observations with the latest report 
date. Stock information such as prices, SIC codes, cumulative fac- 
tors to adjust shares outstanding and returns are obtained from 
CRSP monthly stock database and matched with mutual fund data- 
base. Fund-stock observations which cannot be matched with the 
CRSP are omitted.8 This does not constitute a major problem since 
the stocks which are not in the CRSP database are usually very small, 
and are therefore not likely to be widely held by mutual funds. Panel 
B of Table 1, presents the average and median ratios of the total 
value of CRSP stocks holdings to total assets of mutual funds for var- 
ious years during the sample period. As can be seen from this panel, 
CRSP stocks constitutes significant portion of total assets of mutual 
funds. Industries are classified in this paper by using Fama and 
French (1997) 49 Industry specification.9
3. Methodology
In this section we review the application of the two herding 
measures that are proposed by LSV (1992) and Sias (2004) to the 
industries. We also present the buy and sell conditional LSV herd- 
ing measures proposed by Wermers (1999).
3.1. The LSV herding measure
One of the main objectives of this study is to examine whether 
mutual funds herd in and out of industries. In this sub-section, we 
apply the LSV herding measure to industries to evaluate industry 
herding. We start by computing the dollar amount of quarterly 
change of each mutual fund’s holdings in each industry (dolch) as 
in Choi and Sias (2009).
N
dolchj,k,t = ^(pricei,t-1) (holdingsi,j,t - holdingi,j,t-1), (1)
i=1
where N is the number of stocks held by mutual fund j over quarter 
t - 1 to t and belong to industry k, holdingsi,j,t, is the number of 
shares of stock i owned by mutual fund j at the end of quarter t 
adjusted for stock splits, and pricei,t-1 is the per-share price of the 
stock i at the end of quarter t- l.10 Because of changes in stock 
prices, a mutual fund’s dollar holding in an industry might increase 
or decrease even when the fund does not trade stocks in that indus- 
try. To eliminate the effect of stock price changes on the dollar 
amount of change (dolch), we use the previous quarter-end prices 
and the change in the number of shares to compute dollar amount 
of change. We next define mutual fund k as a buyer (seller) in indus- 
try j during quarter f if dolchi,j,k > 0 (dolchi,j,k < 0). Using this definition 
we then compute the ratio of number of buyers to total number of 
buyers and sellers in industry k during quarter t as
where Bk,t (Sk,t) is the number of mutual funds that are buyers 
(seller) in the industry k in quarter t. This ratio is referred to as 
mutual fund demand. 1 Finally, the LSV herding measure, for indus- 
try k and quarter t, HMk,t, is computed as
= |pk,t-pt|-AFk,t, (3)
where pt is the cross-sectional average of the fraction of buyers 
(across all industries) in quarter t. AFk,t is an adjustment factor as 
defined in LSV (1992).12
It should be noted that the LSV herding measure in Eq. (3) mea- 
sures the imbalance in the number of mutual funds that are buyers 
and sellers in industries without distinguishing whether the imbal- 
ance is on the buy or on the sell side. Such distinction is proposed 
by Wermers (1999) who extends LSV’s measure to define buy and 
sell herding measures as
3.2. The Sias herding measure
The LSV herding measure as defined in Eq. (3) detects herding 
only when the number of investors (from a specific group) that 
trade in the same direction exceeds what is expected during the 
same time period. Sias (2004) proposes an alternative herding 
measure that quantifies the degree to which investors follow 
trades of other investors (in the same group) in consecutive peri- 
ods. The Sias herding measure is defined as
(6)
where ρ(pk,t, pk,t-1) is the cross-sectional correlation between ratios 
of buyers to all traders (mutual fund demand) in consecutive quar- 
ters, K is the number of industries, σ(pk,t) is the standard deviation 
of number of buyers to all traders ratio across industries at time t, 
and pk,t is computed as in Eq. (2). We will observe a positive 
cross-sectional correlation (Eq. (6)) if funds follow other funds’ pre- 
vious quarter trades or if they repeat their previous quarter trades. 
The latter case obviously cannot be considered herding and thus its 
influence should be discarded.13 For this reason, Sias (2004) segre- 
gates the cross-sectional correlation into two parts:
(7)
The first term on the right hand side of the Eq. (7) is the contri- 
bution to the cross-sectional correlation of funds following their 
own trades in the previous quarter while the second term is the 
contribution of funds following other funds’ trades in the previous 
quarter. Dn,k,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 (0) if 
fund n buys (sells) industry k in quarter t, Nk,t is the number of 
mutual funds trading industry k in quarter f.
4. Evidence of industry herding by mutual funds
This section reports the empirical evidence of industry herding 
by mutual funds using the previously established industry herding 
measures (Eqs. (3), (4), (5) and (7)) and are estimated over the 
1980-2013 period and by employing the FF 49-industry classifica- 
tion. We first report the statistical outcome of this investigation 
and then present Monte Carlo simulation results that contrast 
the distribution of the LSV and Sias herding measures as compared 
to those implied by a no-herding null hypothesis. We then exam- 
ine herding by funds with different investment objectives and 
whether investor flows drive industry herding. We explore 
whether industry herding is a manifestation of individual stock 
herding and whether it is driven by style investing. We also report 
industry herding by mutual funds in different time periods and 
during high and low investor sentiment periods. Lastly, we inves- 
tigate whether the industry conditions affect mutual fund industry 
herding.
Previous studies propose several theories that explain why 
institutional managers may herd at the individual stock level or 
at the industry level. Institutional managers may herd if they 
receive correlated signals and trade on these signals (investigative 
herding; Froot et al., 1992; Hirshleifer et al., 1994), infer informa- 
tion from the prior trades of other managers and follow their 
trades (informational cascades; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Welch, 
1992), follow other managers due to reputational concerns (repu- 
tational herding; Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Zwiebel, 1995), or 
follow the fads (Friedman, 1984). Furthermore, empirical evidence 
presented in the literature indicates that mutual fund managers 
engage in certain behavioral patterns that might result in herding. 
Specifically, Brown et al. (2014) show that mutual fund managers 
trade on the same new information, Friend et al. (1970) report that 
mutual fund managers mimic the trades of other funds with good 
performance, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) present evidence that 
mutual fund managers trade due to reputational concerns, and 
Falkenstein (1996) documents that mutual funds tend to chase cer- 
tain characteristics. These theoretical and empirical studies indi- 
cate the possibility that the mutual funds herd in industries. We 
test the following hypothesis by employing both LSV and Sias 
herding measures.
Hl. Mutual funds herd in industries.14
4.3.3. LSV herding measure- the evidence
Table 2 displays the mean and median levels for the LSV herding 
measure (HM) and the Wermers’ (1999) buy herding measure 
(BHM) and sell herding measure (SHM). Following Wermers 
(1999) the results are presented for industry-quarters traded by 
at least 5, 20 and 50 mutual funds. The three respective mean val- 
ues for the industry herding measure (HM) as reported in Panel A 
are 1.599%, 1.557%, and 1.529%, all are significant at the 1% level. 
These figures are in line with Choi and Sias’ (2009) findings for 
all institutions and are slightly higher than that reported by LSV 
(1992) for pension funds. Panel A also presents the corresponding 
median values. All medians are also statistically significantly at the 
1% level and are considerably lower than their respective means, 
signifying right-skewness of this herding measure.15 Panel B pre- 
sents the mean and median values for buy and sell herding for the 
industry-quarters traded by at least 5, 20, and 50 mutual funds 
respectively. As can be seen from this panel, the sell herding figures 
are slightly greater than the buy herding figures, but not significantly 
so for the industry-quarters where there are at least 50 active 
mutual funds.16
The observed overall mean herding levels, though statistically 
significant, are not high. As indicated by Table 2 for the case where 
there are at least 50 active mutual funds on average 1.529% more 
mutual funds trade industries in the same direction than what is 
expected.
4.3.2. Sias herding measure - the evidence
In this sub-section we examine whether mutual funds herd in 
industries using the Sias herding measure as defined in Eq. (7). This
Table 2
Evidence of herding-LSV measure.
At least 5 active mutual funds At least 20 active mutual funds At least 50 active mutual funds
Panel A. Herding measure
Mean 0.01599 0.01557 0.01529
t-Stat (29.83) (30.66) (31.97)
Median 0.00827 0.00820 0.00827
Panel B. Buy and sell herding measures
Buy herding measure
Mean 0.01491 0.01442 0.01475
t-Stat (19.51) (19.84) (21.15)
Median 0.00760 0.00743 0.00769
Sell herding measure
Mean 0.01700 0.01663 0.01579
t-Stat (22.62) (23.45) (24.04)
Median 0.00874 0.00879 0.00864
This table presents mean and median values of the LSV herding measures (unconditional, buy, and sell) for industry quarters where there are at least 5,20 
and 50 active mutual funds during the 1980-2013 period. The LSV herding measure, for each industry-quarter is defined as HMk,t, = |pk,t - pt| - AFk,t, 
where pk,t is the ratio of number of buyers to total number of mutual funds that are either buyers or sellers, p, is the cross-sectional average of fraction of 
buyers (across K industries) in quarter t, and AFk,t is an adjustment factor that accounts for the fact that even in the case of no herding |pk,t - p,| can be 
greater than zero (by chance or an odd number of traders). The buy herding measure is computed by conditioning HMk,t on (pk,t - p,) > 0, and the sell 
herding measure is computed by conditioning HMk,t on (pk,t - pt) < 0. All stocks that have price information in the CRSP database are included. All sector 
and index funds are excluded. Industries are classified by using Fama and French 49 Industry specification. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
measure is the average cross-sectional correlation of fraction of 
buyers to all traders between all pairs of consecutive quarters. 
However, we are primarily interested in the contribution of funds 
following other mutual funds’ industry trades to this cross-sec- 
tional correlation (second term on the right hand side of Eq. (7)). 
Table 3, Panel A presents the average and median values and the 
corresponding Newey-West adjusted t-statistics of the cross-cor- 
relations (Newey and West, 1987). The mean values of the cross- 
sectional correlation are 23.090%, 24.096%, and 28.935% for the 
cases where there are at least 5, 20, and 50 active mutual funds, 
respectively. These figures are slightly lower than what Choi and 
Sias (2009) find for all institutions, but are still quite high and sta- 
tistically significant at the 1% level. The median values for the 
cross-sectional correlations are very close to the mean levels. Panel 
B of this table reports the component of cross-sectional correlation 
that arises from funds following their own industry trades (first 
term in Eq. (7)), while Panel C presents the component that arises 
from funds following other funds’ industry trades (second term in 
Eq. (7)). As can be seen from this table the contribution of funds 
following other funds constitutes a significant portion of the total 
cross-sectional correlation.
We next segregate the total cross-sectional correlation and its 
two components into two parts, namely the contribution of buy 
herding and contribution of sell herding. The contributions of 
buy and sell herding to the total cross-sectional correlation and 
to its two components are computed by taking into account those 
previous quarter mutual fund demand figures in excess of (for buy 
herding) or less than (for sell herding) 0.5. Panels D, E, and F of 
Table 3 present the contribution of buy and sell herding to the total 
cross-sectional correlation, the contribution of mutual funds fol­
lowing their own industry trades, and the contribution of mutual 
funds following other funds’ industry trades, respectively. As for 
other panels of this table, the results are reported for the indus­
try-quarters where there are at least 5, 20, and 50 active mutual 
funds. As can be seen from these panels the contribution of buy 
and sell herding to the total cross-sectional correlation and its 
two components are similar to each other. We also conduct tests 
and find that contributions of buy and sell herding are not signifi­
cantly different from each other.
To sum up, the results presented in this sub-section are in 
support of hypothesis 1 and provide strong evidence of industry
herding by mutual funds in the Sias herding framework, that is, 
mutual funds follow other mutual funds’ previous quarter industry 
trades.
4.2. Simulation results vs. actual data
In this sub-section, as an additional test for the existence of 
industry herding by mutual funds, we run Monte Carlo simulations 
to examine whether the actual distributions of the LSV and Sias 
herding measures are different from those we would observe if 
no herding takes place. To generate the simulated distributions 
of the two herding measures, we follow a similar procedure to that 
employed by Wermers (1999). The number of mutual funds that 
are buyers in industry k in quarter f is modeled as a binomial dis- 
tribution, b(nk,t, pt) where nk,t is the actual total number of mutual 
funds that are either buyers or sellers in industry k in quarter t 
(Bk,t + Sk,t), and pt is the actual cross-sectional average of the frac- 
tion of buyers (across all industries) in quarter t. For each indus- 
try-quarter, we draw a random number between 0 and 1, round 
it to 0 if the random draw is less than 1 - pt and round it to 1 
otherwise. 0 indicates that fund is a seller while 1 indicates that 
fund is a buyer. This step is repeated nk,t times to give a draw from 
binomial distribution, b(nk,t, pt). We then repeat these steps for 
each industry-quarter. Using the drawn number of buyers and sell- 
ers, we compute the simulated fraction of buyers to all traders, pk,t 
for each industry-quarter and the simulated cross-sectional aver- 
age of the fraction of buyers, p* (across K industries), for each quar- 
ter. We use the simulated fraction of buyers pk,t* and the simulated 
cross-sectional average of fraction of buyers, pt to compute the 
simulated LSV (HMsim) and the simulated Sias (ρ(pk,t, Pk,t-1*)) 
herding measures. We repeat this procedure to generate 1000 sim- 
ulated industry-quarter observations for each actual industry- 
quarter observation.
Panel A of Fig. 1 presents the simulated and actual distributions 
of the LSV herding measure. As can be seen from this figure the 
actual distribution of this measure has fatter right tail than the 
simulated one, indicating that mutual funds engage in herding 
behavior in industries beyond the level that is expected by random 
chance. Fig. 1, Panel B shows the actual and the simulated distribu- 
tions of the Sias herding measure. The actual distribution lies to the 
right of the simulated distribution, which is consistent with actual
Table 3
Evidence of herding-Sias measure.
At least 5 active mutual funds At least 20 active mutual funds At least 50 active mutual funds
Panel A Total cross-sectional correlation
Mean 0.23090 0.24096 0.28935
t-Stat (11.56) (13.41) (17.68)
Median 0.22751 0.25352 0.30076
Panel B. Contribution of mutual funds following their own industry trades
Mean 0.05907 0.05207 0.04669
t-Stat (16.07) (18.83) (17.89)
Median 0.05437 0.05021 0.04645
Panel C. Contribution of mutual funds following other funds’ industry trades
Mean 0.17184 0.18889 0.24267
t-Stat (8.64) (10.34) (15.22)
Median 0.16509 0.19385 0.24300
Panel D. Total cross-sectional correlation
Contribution of buy
Mean 0.11229 0.12137 0.14549
t-Stat (8.30) (9.99) (12.7)
Median 0.11398 0.12697 0.15718
Contribution of sell
Mean 0.11861 0.11958 0.14387
t-Stat (12.08) (13.14) (16.69)
Median 0.11103 0.11719 0.14770
Panel E. Contribution of mutual funds following their own industry trades
Contribution of buy
Mean 0.02514 0.02231 0.02032
t-Stat (13.52) (14.38) (15.42)
Median 0.02185 0.02061 0.01895
Contribution of sell
Mean 0.03392 0.02975 0.02637
t-Stat (14.63) (19.83) (17.83)
Median 0.02917 0.02826 0.02399
Panel F. Contribution of mutual funds following other funds’ industry trades
Contribution of buy
Mean 0.08714 0.09906 0.12517
t-Stat (6.61) (8.29) (11.22)
Median 0.08679 0.10000 0.13468
Contribution of sell
Mean 0.08469 0.08983 0.11750
t-Stat (8.58) (9.37) (13.37)
Median 0.07757 0.08584 0.11003
This table presents mean and median levels, and the corresponding t-Statistics based on Newey-West adjusted standard errors of the Sias herding measure for industry- 
quarters where there are at least 5, 20 and 50 active mutual funds during the 1980-2013 period. The Sias herding measure is defined as the cross-sectional correlation 
between ratios of buyers to all traders in current and previous quarter, ρ(pk,t, pk,t-1). This cross sectional correlation is segregated into two parts, cross-sectional correlation 
due to funds following their own trades into the same industries and cross-sectional correlation due to funds following other funds into the same industries. Panels A, B and C 
present the mean, corresponding t-statistic, and median values for total cross-sectional correlation, contribution of mutual funds following their own industry trades, and 
contribution of mutual funds following other funds’ industry trades, respectively. The total cross-sectional correlation and its two parts are further segregated into two parts, 
contribution of buy herding (industries mutual funds purchased in quarter t -1) and contribution of sell herding (industries mutual funds sold in quarter t - 1). Panels D, E, 
and F present these results. All stocks that have price information in the CRSP database are included. All sector and index funds are excluded. Industries are classified by using 
Fama and French 49 Industry specification.
cross-sectional correlations being much higher than what we may 
observe by random chance alone. We employ the Kolgomorov- 
Smirnov two-sample test and find that the actual sample distribu- 
tions of the LSV and Sias herding measures are statistically differ- 
ent from their corresponding simulated distributions at the 1% 
significance level.17 These results provide evidence of mutual fund 
herding in industries.
4.3. Industry herding and investment objectives
As discussed in Section 2 our sample includes mutual funds 
with “aggressive-growth”, “growth” and "growth-income" invest- 
ment objectives. In order to examine whether these different types 
of mutual funds exhibit differences in their herding behavior, in 
this sub-section we compute average herding levels separately 
for these different types of funds. There is evidence of industry
herding within each of the three mutual fund investment objective 
categories. For example, for industry-quarters for which there are 
at least five active traders the mean LSV measures for the aggres- 
sive-growth, growth and growth-income funds are 1.044%, 
1.174%, and 1.185%, respectively; all of them are statistically signif- 
icant at the 1% level and these means are not significantly different 
from each other.18 Funds with aggressive-growth investment objec- 
tive exhibit significantly lower levels of buy herding LSV measure as 
compared to the two other types of funds. Mean sell herding LSV 
measure for aggressive-growth mutual funds is slightly higher than 
that of growth and growth-income mutual funds. Furthermore, the 
differences between mean herding levels (unconditional, buy, and 
sell) using LSV measure exhibited by growth and growth-income 
funds are not statistically significant. Using the Sias measure, 
we report that the mean total cross sectional correlation for the
Panel A. Distributions of the Simulated and Actual LSV Herding Measure
Distribution of HMsim Distribution of HM
Panel B. Distributions of the Actual and Simulated Sias Herding Measure
Distribution of SIASHMsim Distribution of SiasHM
Fig. 1. Distributions of actual and simulated herding measures. The number of mutual funds that are buyers in industry If in quarter t, is modeled as a binomial distribution, 
b(nk,t, pt) where nk,t is the actual total number of mutual funds that are either buyers or sellers in industry If in quarter t (Bk,t + Sk,t), and pt is the actual cross-sectional average 
of fraction of buyers (across K industries) in quarter t. First, for each industry-quarter, a random number between 0 and 1 is drawn, and is rounded to 0 if the random draw is 
less than 1 - pt and rounded to 1 otherwise. This step is repeated nk,t times and then for each industry-quarter. Then, using the simulated number of buyers and sellers, the 
simulated fraction of buyers, pk,t, and the simulated cross-sectional average of fraction of buyers, p* (across K industries) are computed in quarter t. Finally, the simulated LSV 
herding measure, HMsimk,t, is computed for each industry-quarter as HMsimk,t = |pk,t - pt - AFk,t. Actual LSV herding measure HM, as described in Table 2, is also calculated 
for our sample. For each adjacent quarters, simulated Sias measure (SiasHmsim), ρ(pk,t*, pk,t-1), the cross-sectional correlation between ratios of simulated number of buyers 
to all traders in current and previous quarter, is also computed. This procedure is repeated to generate 1000 simulated industry-quarter observations for each actual industry- 
quarter observation. Actual Sias measure (SiasHM) p(pk,t, pk,t-1) as described in Table 3, is also calculated for our sample. Panel A presents the simulated and actual 
distribution of the LSV herding measure (HMsimk,t, HMk,t). Panel B presents the simulated Sias herding measure (SiasHMsim), ρ(pk,t, pk,t-1*) and actual distribution of the Sias 
herding measure, p(pk,t, pk,t-1).
aggressive-growth, growth and growth-income funds are 11.00%, 
15.84%, and 13.57%, respectively and all three are statistically signif- 
icant at the 1% level. There is no significant difference between the 
herding levels according to Sias herding measure among the three 
types of mutual funds.
4.4. Is industry herding driven by fund flows?
In this sub-section we examine whether the evidence of indus- 
try herding that is presented in the preceding sub-sections is dri- 
ven by fund flows. Coval and Stafford (2007) show that mutual 
funds buy more of the stocks that they already hold when they 
experience cash inflows. Likewise, mutual funds have to sell their 
holdings when they suffer excessive cash outflows. If cash inflows 
and/or outflows are concentrated on funds that have similar
industry allocations, even in the absence of any herding behavior, 
flows might induce funds to trade in the same direction and cause 
imbalance between the proportion of number of buyers and sellers. 
Similarly if these investor flows persist over several quarters 
they might result in positive cross-sectional correlation between 
mutual fund demands in consecutive quarters. Therefore, we need 
to ensure that our reported herding behavior is not driven by fund 
inflows and outflows and hence we test the following hypothesis:
H2. Mutual fund industry herding is not driven by fund flows.
To control for the effect of flows on industry herding measures, 
we require a fund to change its portfolio weight in an industry in 
the same direction with its trade to be classified as an active trader 
for that industry-quarter.
Table 4
Herding levels after controlling for fund flows.
At least 5 active mutual funds At least 20 active mutual funds At least 50 active mutual funds
Panel A. LSV herding measure 
Herding measure
Mean
t-Stat
Median
0.03612
(48.43)
0.02424
0.03620
(49.72)
0.02439
0.03739
(50.58)
0.02542
Buy herding measure
Mean 0.03377 0.03404 0.03562
t-Stat (33.8) (34.59) (35.69)
Median 0.02295 0.02302 0.02436
Sell herding measure
Mean 0.03857 0.03846 0.03926
t-Stat (34.75) (35.77) (35.89)
Median 0.02560 0.02591 0.02655
Panel B. Sias herding measure
Mean Mutual funds following their own trades 0.02851 0.02170 0.01768
t-Stat (7.84) (8.4) (6.96)
Median 0.02053 0.01789 0.01504
Mean Mutual funds following other funds’ trades 0.10999 0.11205 0.13827
t-Stat (4.8) (4.77) (5.59)
Median 0.13139 0.13026 0.13579
Mean Total cross-sectional correlation 0.13849 0.13375 0.15594
t-Stat (5.60) (5.52) (6.01)
Median 0.15517 0.15757 0.15395
This table presents the industry herding levels of mutual funds controlling for fund flows. Different from Tables 2 and 3, in this table, we require a mutual fund to change the 
allocation of an industry as well as trade in the same direction to be counted as an active trader (buyer or seller). The LSV herding measures (unconditional, buy, and sell) are 
as in Table 2. Panel A presents the mean and median values of these LSV herding measures for the industry-quarters where there are at least 5,20 and 50 active mutual funds 
during the 1980-2013 period. Panel B presents mean and median levels, and the corresponding t-statistics based on Newey-West adjusted standard errors of the Sias herding 
measure. The Sias herding measure is as defined in Table 3. All sector and index funds are excluded. Industries are classified by using Fama and French 49 Industry 
specification.
Panels A and B of Table 4 present the mean and median herding 
levels of the LSV and Sias measures, respectively after controlling 
for fund flows. As can be seen from Panel A of this table the respec- 
tive mean LSV herding measures are 3.612%, 3.620%, and 3.739% 
(significant at the 1% level) for the industry-quarters where there 
are at least five, twenty, and fifty active mutual funds, respectively. 
The mean and median values for the buy and sell herding are also 
reported in this panel. These figures are considerably higher than 
those reported in Table 2. In contrast, we observe that controlling 
for fund flows decreases the observed Sias measures as reported in 
Panel B. The corresponding mean Sias measures are 13.849%, 
13.375%, and 15.594% for the three different filters of number of 
active mutual funds. However, these figures are still significant at 
the 1% level. The contribution of funds following other funds con- 
tinues to be a significant portion of total cross-sectional correla- 
tion. In sum, these results reveal that industry herding is not 
driven by fund flows and support hypothesis 2.
4.5. Is industry herding driven by individual stock herding?
The preceding subsections provide evidence of mutual fund 
herding in industries. In this subsection, we examine whether this 
observed industry herding is a manifestation of individual stock 
herding that is reported in the literature (e.g. Wermers, 1999; 
GTW, 1995). Choi and Sias (2009) provide evidence that institu- 
tional industry herding is not a manifestation of individual stock 
herding. We hypothesize that even in the presence of individual 
stock herding mutual funds might herd at the industry level. We 
test the following hypothesis:
H3. Mutual fund industry herding is not a manifestation of 
individual stock herding.
To test this hypothesis in the LSV framework we repeat the 
analysis performed in Section 4.1.1 after excluding the stock 
with the highest level of herding for each industry-quarter. The
rationale for this filter is that, if we still find evidence of industry 
herding even when the contribution of highest herded stock is 
not taken into account then the observed industry herding cannot 
be a manifestation of individual stock herding. We find that after 
excluding the stock with the highest herding level in each-industry 
quarter, the mean LSV herding measure is 1.0827% and statistically 
significant at the 1% level for the industry-quarters where there are 
at least 50 active mutual funds.
To examine the same question in the Sias framework we follow 
Choi and Sias’ (2009) methodology. Choi and Sias (2009) first 
define the ratio of buyers to all traders for an industry-quarter as 
the weighted average of this ratio for individual stocks belonging 
to the same industry where the previous quarter-end market value 
is used to compute the weights. They then decompose the cross- 
sectional correlation of the current and previous quarter weighted 
ratio of number of buyers to all traders into four components: the 
contribution of funds following their own stock trades, contribu­
tion of funds following other funds’ individual stock trades, contri­
bution of funds following themselves into other stocks in the same 
industry and contribution of funds following other funds into other 
stocks in the same industry. We need to focus on the fourth com­
ponent of cross-sectional correlation. For our sample, the mean 
values for the first, second, third, and fourth components are 
4.89%, 16.69%, 5.02%, and 6.05%, respectively.19 The total cross-sec- 
tional correlation is 32.66%. All these figures are statistically signifi- 
cant at the 1% level. 20 These results indicate that while the 
significant portion of the cross-sectional correlation arises due to 
funds following other funds into the same stock, a nontrivial portion 
arises due to funds following other funds into different stocks in the 
same industry.
To sum, the findings in this sub-section reveal that although 
individual stock herding contributes to the industry herding that 
we observe, industry herding is not a manifestation of individual 
stock herding supporting our hypothesis 3.
4.6. Is industry herding driven by style investing?
In this sub-section we explore the contribution of style invest- 
ing to the industry herding by mutual funds. Style investing can 
contribute to industry herding due to the following two main rea- 
sons. First, many industries are comprised of stocks with similar 
characteristics in terms of market capitalizations (size) and book- 
to-market ratios (B/M).21 Funds may invest in the same industries 
as a result of their other style-strategies, such as size and B/M. Sec- 
ond, as Choi and Sias (2009) suggest, industry related information 
that managers receive might also have size-B/M components. As a 
result the observed industry herding by mutual funds may be mainly 
driven by mutual fund herding in different stocks with similar size- 
B/M styles within the same industry.
To examine the extent to which style investing contributes to 
industry herding by mutual funds we follow a similar methodology 
to that of Choi and Sias (2009). We first group stocks into six styles 
based on size and B/M, two size groups based on median NYSE size, 
and three groups based on B/M ratios using the 30th and 70th per- 
centile as the cut off values.22 We then segregate the contribution of 
funds following other funds into other stocks in the same industry 
(fourth component of total cross sectional correlation from Sec- 
tion 4.5) into two: (1) different stocks in the same industry and in 
the same style group and (2) different stocks in the same industry 
but in different style groups. We also compute the expected contri- 
bution of these two components to this fourth component of total 
cross sectional correlation.23 We find that the average contributions 
of components (1) and (2) are 2.67% and 3.37%, respectively, and 
both are significant at the 1% level.24 The expected contributions of 
(1) and (2) are 2.25% and 3.80%, respectively. The difference between 
the expected and the actual values of components (1) and (2) are 
0.43% and -0.43%, and these differences are not significantly differ- 
ent from zero. These findings suggest that industry herding is not 
mainly driven by style investing.
4.7. Industry herding by mutual funds in different time periods
In this sub-section we examine industry herding by mutual 
funds over different time periods. Following Choi and Sias (2009), 
first, we split our sample period into two sub-periods, 1980- 
1995, and 1996-2013, to examine whether mutual fund industry 
herding increased once institutional investors were required to file 
their holding positions through the Electronic Data Gathering and 
Retrieval (EDGAR) system after 1996. Second, we divide our sam- 
ple period into three sub-periods 80s (1980-1989), 90s (1990- 
1999), and 2000s (2000-2013) to explore whether there is any
change in herding behavior by mutual funds over the three dec- 
ades. Barras et al. (2010) find that US fund managers’ skill levels 
exhibit signs of deterioration over the years to date. Hence we 
would expect that the magnitude of industry herding grows stron- 
ger over the decades. Third, we examine industry herding over the 
internet bubble and bust period (1998-2001).
Results of these analyses are reported in Table 5. Panels A and B 
present the mean and the corresponding t-statistics of the LSV and 
Sias herding measures, respectively for the different time periods. 
The mean LSV (SIAS) measure for the post-Edgar period (1996- 
2013) is slightly higher (lower) than that for the pre-Edgar period 
(1980-1995). However, consistent with the findings of Choi and 
Sias (2009) we find that these differences are not significantly dif- 
ferent from zero. We also find that the average LSV measure, which 
is 1.629% during the 90s, is slightly higher than the average LSV 
measures during the 80s and 2000s, but not significantly so. The 
average Sias herding measure during the 80s is slightly higher than 
the two other sub-periods, but again these differences are not sig- 
nificant at the 5% level. Therefore, the evidence reported in panels 
A and B of Table 5, does not indicate that industry herding by 
mutual funds increased progressively over the decades. We also 
find that industry herding by mutual funds during the internet 
bubble and bust period is slightly higher than that over the entire 
sample period. However, the average Sias herding measures for 
this period are similar to those for the entire sample period.
4.8. Investor sentiment and industry herding by mutual funds
Previous studies, (LSV, 1992; Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; and 
Shleifer, 2000) suggest that individual investor sentiment might 
affect institutional herding. A more recent study by Liao et al. 
(2011) examines whether previous investor sentiment explains 
the cross-sectional variation in individual stock herding by mutual 
funds over the 2003-2007 period. They find evidence that mutual 
funds engage in sell herding in stocks that have prior high senti- 
ment. They conclude that this finding is consistent with the senti- 
ment countering hypothesis which states that rational investors 
tend to counteract the optimistic sentiment of the retail/noise 
investors.
In this sub-section, we investigate whether overall market-wide 
investor sentiment affects industry herding by mutual funds. We 
employ Baker and Wurgler’s (2007) monthly investor sentiment 
index to identify high and low investor sentiment periods.25 This 
investor sentiment index is constructed based on six sentiment 
proxies, namely, trading volume, the dividend premium, the 
closed-end fund discount, the number and first-day returns on IPOs 
and the equity share in new issues.26 As we have quarterly herding 
measures we first compute quarterly averages of monthly investor 
sentiment index. We next compute average quarterly investor senti­
ment over the 1980-2010 period.27 We identify the quarters with 
investor sentiment higher (lower) than the sample period average 
as high (low) investor sentiment periods. We then compute mean 
herding levels separately for the quarters following the high senti­
ment and low sentiment quarters. Panel A of Table 6 presents the 
LSV herding measures (unconditional, buy, and sell) after the high 
and low sentiment quarters as well as the difference between them 
for the industry-quarters where there are at least 5, 20, and 50 active 
mutual funds. For the industry-quarters where there are at least 5 
active mutual funds, average herding measure is higher after the 
high investor sentiment periods than that after the low investor
Table 5
Herding levels in different time periods.
1980-1995 1996-2013 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2013 1998-2001
Panel A. LSV herding measure 
Herding measure
Mean 0.01459
t-Stat (18.14)
0.01578
(26.93)
0.01452
(13.11)
0.01629
(18.16)
0.01505
(23.54)
0.02223
(14.86)
Buy herding measure
Mean 0.01418 0.01517 0.01497 0.01451 0.01479 0.02136
t-Stat (12.44) (17.37) (9.36) (11.73) (15.18) (9.52)
Sell herding measure
Mean 0.01499 0.01634 0.01408 0.01790 0.01528 0.02284
t-Stat (13.21) (20.71) (9.18) (13.89) (18.20) (11.40)
Panel B. Sias herding measure 
Total cross-sectional correlation
Mean 0.30715 0.27403 0.33052 0.27260 0.27339 0.30798
t-Stat (12.26) (13.16) (9.24) (12.34) (10.86) (9.56)
Mutual funds following themselves
Mean 0.05412 0.04028 0.05735 0.04603 0.03992 0.03356
t-Stat (15.17) (14.63) (10.87) (13.11) (13.79) (9.49)
Mutual funds following others
Mean 0.25302 0.23375 0.27317 0.22657 0.23347 0.27442
t-Stat (10.63) (11.06) (8.10) (9.53) (9.31) (8.28)
This table presents the industry herding levels of mutual funds in different time periods. LSV herding measures (unconditional, buy, and sell) are all as defined in Table 2. Sias 
herding measure is as defined in Table 3. Panel A presents the herding levels according to LSV herding measure in pre-Edgar (1980-1995) and post-Edgar (1996-2013) era, in 
three subperiods, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, and during internet bubble and bust period (1998-2001). Panel B presents the herding levels according to Sias herding measure for 
the same time periods. Results are presented in Panel A and B are for the industry-quarters where there are at least 50 active mutual funds.
sentiment period. Furthermore, this difference is mainly due to 
higher sell herding after high investor sentiment periods.28 This evi- 
dence is consistent with the findings of Liao et al. (2011) and sup- 
ports the sentiment countering hypothesis. However, as we filter 
the industry-quarter observations with less than 20 active traders 
the difference between the average of sell herding measures after 
the high and the low investor sentiment periods diminishes and it 
becomes insignificant after applying 50 active traders filter. This 
finding suggests that investor sentiment effect on sell herding of 
mutual funds is more prominent in smaller industries. These indus- 
tries are more likely to include stocks of relatively lower size for 
which investor sentiment is more relevant. As these industries are 
filtered out after applying higher number of active fund thresholds, 
investor sentiment impact on fund herding fades out.
Panel B of Table 6 reports mean Sias herding measure (total 
cross-sectional correlation and its two parts) after the high and 
low sentiment quarters as well as the difference between them 
for the industry-quarters where there are at least 5, 20, and 50 
active mutual funds. We find no meaningful difference between 
the Sias herding measures after high and low sentiment periods.
To sum up, we find some evidence that mutual funds tend to 
engage in (same quarter) sell herding in industries more after opti­
mistic sentiment periods, consistent with the sentiment counter­
ing hypothesis.
4.9. Industry conditions and mutual fund industry herding
In this sub-section we examine whether industry conditions 
affect industry herding by mutual funds. Specifically, we explore 
whether previous quarter’s industry conditions such as return, vol­
atility, and volume affect industry herding.
We perform similar analysis to that of a recent study by 
Gavriilidis et al. (2013), which documents evidence that sector
and market conditions affect industry herding by Spanish mutual 
funds. First, we examine the impact of industry returns on mutual 
fund industry herding. In order to identify high-mid-low return 
periods for each industry, we rank the quarterly value weighted 
returns of each industry over our sample period into three groups 
(high-mid-low industry returns). We compute average subsequent 
quarter LSV measures separately for these high-mid-low return 
groups. Panel A of Table 7 presents the mean LSV herding measures 
(unconditional, buy, and sell) for the high, mid, and low industry 
return groups. The last column reports the difference between 
the herding measures for high and low industry return groups. 
As can be seen from this panel highest (lowest) industry herding 
is exhibited when the industry returns are high (low). Further- 
more, the difference between herding measures in high and low 
industry return groups is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The results for the buy and sell herding measures indicate that 
the difference between the (unconditional) herding levels is mainly 
driven by buy herding. There is no evidence that industry returns 
affect subsequent quarter sell herding by mutual funds.
Second, we examine the effect of industry volatility on industry 
herding using a similar analysis. We define quarterly volatility as 
the standard deviation of daily (value weighted) industry returns 
for each industry-quarter. In order to identify high-mid-low vola- 
tility periods for each industry, we rank the quarterly volatility of 
each industry over our sample period into three groups. We again 
compute average subsequent quarter LSV measures separately for 
these high-mid-low volatility groups. Panel B of Table 7 presents 
the results of the volatility analysis. Similar to Panel A we report 
evidence that industry herding is higher after periods of high 
industry volatility and this difference is mainly driven by the dif- 
ference in buy herding for these high and low volatility groups. 29
Lastly, we investigate the impact of industry turnover on indus- 
try herding by mutual funds. We divide monthly volume by the 
number of outstanding shares (from CRSP monthly files) to com- 
pute monthly turnover for each stock in each industry. Using the 
month-end market capitalizations we compute value-weighted
Table 6
Herding Levels and Investor Sentiment.
At least 5 active mutual funds At least 20 active mutual funds At least 50 active mutual funds
High Low Difference High Low Difference High Low Difference
Panel A. LSV herding measure 
Herding measure
Mean 0.01718 0.01484 0.00234 0.01626 0.01504 0.00122 0.01558 0.01519 0.00038
t-Stat (20.94) (19.56) (2.09) (21.4) (19.94) (1.14) (22.22) (20.65) (0.38)
Buy herding measure
Mean 0.01574 0.01498 0.00076 0.01469 0.01516 -0.00047 0.01529 0.01527 0.00002
t-Stat (13.55) (13.43) (0.47) (13.63) (13.62) (-0.30) (14.95) (13.97) (0.01)
Sell herding measure
Mean 0.01851 0.01471 0.00380 0.01768 0.01493 0.00275 0.01584 0.01512 0.00072
t-Stat (16.00) (14.22) (2.45) (16.55) (14.56) (1.86) (16.44) (15.24) (0.52)
Panel B. SIAS herding measure
Total cross-sectional correlation
Mean 0.24798 0.21954 0.02844 0.26004 0.22903 0.03100 0.31199 0.28122 0.03077
t-Stat (8.32) (7.67) (0.81) (11.11) (7.91) (0.89) (14.46) (13.47) (1.05)
Mutual funds following themselves
Mean 0.06379 0.05453 0.00926 0.05406 0.04968 0.00438 0.04943 0.04334 0.00609
t-Stat (11.63) (11.51) (1.64) (13.31) (13.74) (1.14) (12.73) (15.31) (1.90)
Mutual funds following others
Mean 0.18419 0.16501 0.01918 0.20598 0.17935 0.02662 0.26256 0.23788 0.02468
t-Stat (6.42) (5.31) (0.56) (8.90) (5.93) (0.77) (12.82) (11.45) (0.86)
This table presents the industry herding levels of mutual funds in high and low sentiment periods. LSV herding measures (unconditional, buy, and sell) are all as defined in 
Table 2. Sias herding measure is as defined in Table 3. Baker and Wurgler’s (2007) monthly investor sentiment index is employed to identify high and low investor sentiment 
quarters. We first compute quarterly averages of monthly investor sentiment index. We next compute average quarterly investor sentiment over the 1980-2010 period. We 
identify the quarters with investor sentiment higher (lower) than the sample period average as high (low) investor sentiment periods. Panel A presents the subsequent 
quarter herding levels according to LSV herding measure after high and low investor sentiment periods, as well as the difference between herding levels after these two 
different investor sentiment periods. Panel B presents the herding levels according to Sias herding measure after high and low investor sentiment periods, as well as the 
difference between herding levels after these two different investor sentiment periods. Results are reported separately for the industry-quarters where there are at least 5,20, 
and 50 active mutual funds.
turnover for each industry-month. We then compute quarterly 
turnover for each industry by averaging the monthly industry turn- 
over in each quarter. After computing quarterly industry turnover 
we again identify high-mid-low turnover quarters for each indus- 
try. Panel C of Table 7 presents the average LSV herding measures 
for the high-mid-low industry turnover groups, as well as the dif- 
ference between the average herding levels in high and low indus- 
try turnover groups. The results presented in this panel indicate 
that there is no significant effect of industry turnover on industry 
herding.30
We also perform similar analysis to examine the effect of indus- 
try conditions on industry herding in the Sias framework. How- 
ever, we find no significant effect of industry conditions on 
industry herding using Sias herding measure.31
To sum up, we find evidence that industry return and industry 
volatility affect industry herding by mutual funds in the subse­
quent quarter. Mutual funds tend to buy industries in herds after 
high industry returns and high industry volatility periods. How­
ever, industry conditions do not affect the extent to which mutual 
funds’ chase previous quarter industry trades of other mutual 
funds. These findings suggest that managers’ tendency to buy in 
herds increases following good news in order to avoid a potential 
criticism of having low ability, by claiming that they made good 
investment choices similar to those made by other managers. Peri­
ods of high industry volatility may indicate periods of greater flow
of information and higher information uncertainty (e.g., Ross, 
1989; Zhang, 2006). Industry herding following these periods 
might rise as some managers may find it more difficult to interpret 
new information and instead mimic their peers in order to avoid a 
possible underperformance.
5. Does mutual fund herding in industries destabilize industry 
market values?
Previous empirical studies report positive contemporaneous 
relationship between institutional herding and stock returns, that 
is, stocks bought by herds outperform stocks sold by herds (e.g., 
Wermers, 1999; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Sias, 2004). These stud- 
ies also find that stocks bought by herds continue to outperform 
stocks sold by herds in the short term with no subsequent return 
reversals and conclude that herding by institutions (and mutual 
funds) at the stock level does not drive stock prices away from 
their fundamentals. In contrast, Dasgupta et al. (201la,b) and 
Gutierrez and Kelley (2008) document that persistent herding by 
institutions in stocks can drive stock prices away from their 
fundamentals.
There is also a theoretical paper by Dasgupta et al. (201la,b) 
which suggests that reputational herding by institutions can cause 
short-term return continuation and long term return reversal in 
the stocks that experience high levels of herding. However, accord­
ing to their model, institutional herding is driven by institutional 
managers’ reputational motivations. If herding occurs as a result 
of correlated signals received by institutional managers, the impact 
of herding on prices can be quite different. Specifically, for the 
herding at the industry level, which is the focus of this paper, if 
mutual funds trade based on the new information which is yet to 
disseminate across all stocks within an industry, we do not expect 
a destabilizing effect of industry herding on industry values. We, 
therefore, test the following hypothesis:
Table 7
Industry conditions and industry herding.
High Mid Low Diff.
Panel A Industry return 
Herding measure (HM)
Mean
t-Stat
0.01667
(21.19)
0.01537
(19.70)
0.01325
(14.02)
0.00342
(2.78)
Buy herding measure
Mean
t-Stat
0.01697
(14.24)
0.01673
(14.51)
0.01034
(8.34)
0.00663
(3.85)
Sell herding measure
Mean
t-Stat
0.01639
(15.84)
0.01412
(13.36)
0.01600
(11.36)
0.00038
(0.22)
Panel B. Industry volatility 
Herding measure (HM)
Mean
t-Stat
0.01669
(20.17)
0.01522
(19.00)
0.01390
(16.24)
0.00279
(2.34)
Buy herding measure
Mean
t-Stat
0.01678
(13.77)
0.01618
(13.56)
0.01228
(10.31)
0.00450
(2.64)
Sell herding measure
Mean
t-Stat
0.01661
(14.80)
0.01435
(13.31)
0.01541
(12.58)
0.00120
(0.72)
Panel C. Industry turnover 
Herding measure (HM)
Mean
t-Stat
0.01509
(20.74)
0.01686
(19.92)
0.01378
(14.77)
0.00131
(1.11)
Buy herding measure
Mean
t-Stat
0.01623
(14.65)
0.01453
(12.18)
0.01446
(10.79)
0.00176
(1.01)
Sell herding measure
Mean
t-Stat
0.01395
(14.82)
0.01882
(15.83)
0.01311
(10.10)
0.00084
(0.53)
This table presents the industry conditions and the industry herding levels of mutual funds in LSV framework for industry-quarters 
where there are at least 50 active mutual funds. LSV herding measures (unconditional, buy, and sell) are all as defined in Table 2. Panel A 
presents the herding levels according to LSV herding measures in high, mid, and low industry return periods. To identify high-mid-low 
return periods for each industry we rank the quarterly value weighted returns of each industry over our sample period into three groups 
(high-mid-low industry returns). First, second, and third column presents the average subsequent quarter LSV herding measures for 
these high, mid, low return groups, respectively. The last column reports the average difference between the herding levels of high and 
low industry return groups. Panel B presents the results of the similar analysis for high, mid, and low industry volatility periods. To 
identify high-mid-low volatility periods for each industry we rank the quarterly volatility of each industry over our sample period into 
three groups. Quarterly volatility is defined as the standard deviation of daily (value weighted) industry returns for each industry- 
quarter. Panel C presents the results of the similar analysis for high, mid, and low industry turnover periods. We divide monthly volume 
by the number of outstanding shares to compute monthly turnover for each stock in each industry. Using the month-end market 
capitalizations we compute value-weighted turnover for each industry-month. Quarterly turnover for each industry is computed by 
averaging the monthly industry turnover in each quarter.
H4. Herding at the industry level by mutual funds does not drive 
industry values away from their fundamentals.
To test this hypothesis, we first rank industries according to 
their previous quarter buy and sell LSV herding levels (Eqs. (4) 
and (5)). We form portfolios of top five industries that experience 
the highest level of buy (sell) herding. We then compute the equal- 
weighted average of value weighted industry returns for these 
portfolios in the quarters following the herding. We also form a dif- 
ference portfolio which buys the top five buy and shorts the top 
five sell herding industries. Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) calen- 
dar time aggregation method is used to calculate the average 
returns of these three industry portfolios for overlapping observa- 
tions.32 All of the above defined portfolios are rebalanced quarterly.
Table 8, Panel A, presents the monthly raw returns as well as 
the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor (Fama and French, 1993), 
and four-factor alphas (Carhart, 1997) for these three portfolios. 
The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The first 
row of Panel A presents the contemporaneous returns and alphas
for the formation period in which top five buy and sell herding 
industries are identified. The raw returns and the alphas for the 
formation period are positive and statistically significant for the 
difference portfolio. The mean monthly raw return as well as the 
monthly CAPM, three-factor, and four-factor alphas for the differ- 
ence portfolio are 1.00%, 0.96%, 0.96%, and 1.18%, respectively, 
which are also economically significant. This finding is consistent 
with prior studies that find a contemporaneous positive relation- 
ship between returns and herding by mutual funds and institu- 
tions. The next rows present the results for subsequent quarter 
(q1). The difference portfolio continues to earn positive returns in 
quarter q1 albeit not statistically significantly different from zero. 
We also compute the returns in quarters q2, q3-q4, q5-q8, and 
q9-q12, and find that the difference portfolio’s returns are not sig- 
nificantly different from zero in the subsequent periods. It can be 
therefore inferred that there is no evidence of return reversals for 
the industries that experience high levels of buy and sell herding.33
Panel B of Table 8 repeats the analysis in the Sias framework. 
Since the Sias herding measure cannot be calculated for each 
industry-quarter we compute the contributions of each industiy
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to the cross-sectional correlation for each consecutive pairs of quar- 
ters. To distinguish between buy and sell herding industries we rank 
these contributions separately for the industries with positive and 
negative differences for both quarters, q0 and q§ (formation quarters). 
To identify these industries, for each quarter, we multiply the differ- 
ence between the fraction of buyers and cross-sectional average of 
the fraction of buyers over the two formation quarters [(pk,t-2 - 
- pt-2)(pk,t-1 - pt-1)]. We separately rank the industries that have 
positive and negative differences for both quarters, q0 and q0. The 
industries with the top five highest contributions among the ones 
with positive (negative) differences for both quarters are identified 
as top five buy (sell) herding industries. The first two rows of Panel 
B present the average raw returns as well as CAPM, three-factor, 
and four-factor alphas during the formation quarters. As in Panel A, 
the difference portfolio has positive and statistically significant raw 
and abnormal returns in the formation quarters. Raw returns for 
the difference portfolio are 0.89% and 0.75% for quarters q0 and q0, 
respectively, and the various monthly alphas for these formation 
quarters range between 0.67% and 0.96%. Panel B also presents the 
results for the subsequent quarter (q1). In quarter q1 the difference 
portfolio’s raw and abnormal returns are positive, but not signifi- 
cantly different from zero. The difference portfolio continues to earn 
returns that are not significantly different from zero in periods q2, q3- 
q4, q5-q8, and q9-q12, indicating no evidence of return reversal.34
The findings in Table 8 point to a positive contemporaneous 
relationship between industry herding and industry returns. There 
is no evidence of return reversals in industries that experience high 
levels of buy and sell herding. Therefore, the hypothesis that herd­
ing does not drive industry values away from fundamentals 
(hypothesis 4) cannot be rejected.
6. Does mutual fund herding in industries contribute to 
industry momentum?
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) show that industries that per- 
formed well (poorly) over the previous six-months continue to 
perform well (poorly) over the subsequent six to twelve month 
period. One of the potential explanations they offer for this phe- 
nomenon is that information may not diffuse simultaneously into 
the stock prices within the same industry. Information is likely to 
be first incorporated into the prices of larger firms and then into 
the prices of other firms. They argue that this lead and lag effect 
within the leaders and other firms in industries can cause the 
observed momentum effect in industry returns. This lead and lag 
effect within industries can also result in industry herding. We 
argue that industry herding and industry momentum can be 
related and therefore we test the following hypothesis.
H5. Industry momentum is related to mutual fund herding at the 
industry level.
Although there is no empirical evidence in the literature about 
the relationship between momentum and herding at the industry 
level, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) document that momentum is 
related to institutional herding at the individual stock level. More 
specifically, they find that winners (losers) that experience largest 
subsequent institutional ownership increase (decrease) exhibit the 
strongest momentum. In this section, we explore the relationship 
between momentum and herding at the industry level by employ­
ing a similar methodology.
We first examine whether there is any evidence of industry 
momentum when industries are classified according to Fama and 
French 49 industry classification. We then investigate whether 
holding period returns of winner and loser industries differ based
Table 9
Industry herding and industry momentum-(6 month formation/6 month holding).
Industry momentum High herding Intermediate herding Low herding High-low
Panel A Raw returns (in percent) 
Past loser industries 0.91*** 0.89*** 0.90*** 0.95*** -0.06
(3.28) (3.13) (3.16) (3.17) (-0.37)
Past winner industries 1.23*** 1.38*** 1.29*** 1.03*** 0.35***
(4.97) (5.26) (5.07) (3.96) (2.67)
Winners-losers 0.32* 0.49** 0.39** 0.08 0.41**
(1.77) (2.25) (2.01) (0.37) (1.97)
Panel B. CAPM alphas (in percent) 
Past loser industries -0.15 -0.15 -0.17 -0.14 -0.02
(-1.23) (-1.00) (-1.26) (-0.86) (-0.12)
Past winner industries 0.23** 0.39*** 0.28** 0.03 0.36***
(2.15) (2.71) (2.43) (0.23) (2.69)
Winners-losers 0.39** 0.54** 0.46** 0.17 0.38*
(2.15) (2.48) (2.34) (0.76) (1.80)
Panel C. Three-factor alphas (in percent)
Past loser industries -0.32***
(-2.70)
-0.30**
(-1.99)
-0.30**
(-2.21)
-0.36**
(-2.46)
0.06
(0.40)
Past winner industries 0.14 0.25* 0.20* -0.03 0.28**
(135) (1.83) (1.75) (-0.22) (2.10)
Winners-losers 0.46** 0.55** 0.50** 0.34 0.22
(2.54) (2.50) (2.53) (1.54) (1.05)
Panel D. The ratio of number of buyers to total number of buyers and sellers
Past loser industries 0.5151 0.5072 0.5108 0.5274 -0.0203
Past winner industries 0.5116 0.5219 0.5091 0.5039 0.0180
Winners-losers -0.0035 0.0147*** -0.0017 -0.0235*** 0.0382***
(-1.19) (3.22) (-0.46) (-4.46) (5.57)
Industries are ranked into quartiles according to their previous six month (formation period) cumulative value weighted returns. The top twelve performing industries are 
defined as winners and the bottom twelve performing industries as losers. Equal weighted portfolios of these winner and loser value weighted industries are then 
constructed. These winner and loser portfolios are held for 6 months (m1 to m6, holding period) and they are rebalanced quarterly. A portfolio that takes long position in the 
winner industries and short position the loser industries is also constructed. Average monthly returns for the winner, loser and winner minus loser industry portfolios over 
the next 6 months are computed. We use the Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) calendar time aggregation method to calculate average returns of industry portfolios for 
overlapping observations. First column of Panel A reports these average returns over the 1980-2013 period for the winner, loser and winner minus loser industry portfolios. 
Industries in the winner and loser portfolios are next grouped into tertiles based on the two formation quarters’ mutual fund demand (pk,t, Eq. (2)) which is the ratio of 
number of buyers to total number buyers and sellers in industry k during quarter t. The top (bottom) four industries with highest (lowest) pk,t ratio among the winners (losers) 
are labeled as high herding industries and the bottom (top) four industries with lowest (highest) pk,t ratio among the winners (losers) are labeled as low herding industries. 
Four industries that constitute the middle fertile based on the pk,t ratio are labeled as intermediate herding industries. Winner, loser and winner minus loser portfolios 
average return are computed separately for these three sub-categories: high herding, intermediate herding, and low herding. The difference between the high herding and 
low herding industries are also presented. The second to fifth columns of Panel A report the average raw returns for these portfolios. Panel B and Panel C report the CAPM and 
Fama-French three-factor alphas, respectively for these portfolios of industries. Panel D presents the pk,t ratio and difference between the pk,t ratio for the winner and loser 
industries. The corresponding t-statistics are presented in parenthesis. Industries are classified by using Fama and French 49 Industry specification. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
on the level of mutual fund demand (Eq. (2)) that they experience 
during the formation period.35
We start by ranking industries into quartiles according to their 
previous six month (formation period; m_5 to m0, where m0 is the 
last month of the formation period) cumulative value weighted 
returns.36 The top twelve performing industries are defined as win- 
ners and the bottom twelve performing industries as losers. We then 
construct equal weighted portfolios of these winner and loser value 
weighted industries. These winner and loser portfolios are held for 
the next six months (holding period, m1 to m6) and they are rebal- 
anced quarterly. We also construct a portfolio that takes long posi- 
tion in the winner industries and short position in the loser 
industries. We compute average monthly returns for the winner, 
loser and winner minus loser industry portfolios over the next six 
months. As in Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), average monthly 
returns of each industry are value weighted, but the winner and
loser industry portfolios are equal weighted. We employ Jegadeesh 
and Titman’s (1993) calendar time aggregation method to calculate 
average returns of industry portfolios for overlapping observations. 
First column of Panel A of Table 9 reports these average returns of 
the winner, loser, and winner minus loser industry portfolios over 
the 1980-2013 period. The winner minus loser portfolio earns a 
monthly average return of 0.32% and it is statistically significant at 
the 10% level. We also compute CAPM and three-factor alphas of 
these three portfolios and present the results in the first columns 
of Panels B and C, respectively. The CAPM and the three factor alpha 
of the winner minus loser (momentum) portfolio is 0.39% and 0.46%, 
respectively and both are statistically significant at the 5% level.
We next group winner and loser industries into tertiles based 
on their mutual fund demand (pk,t, Eq. (2)), the ratio of the number 
of buyers to total number of buyers and sellers in industry k during 
quarter f, during the two quarters of the formation period. The top 
(bottom) four industries with highest (lowest) mutual fund 
demand among the winners (losers) are labeled as high herding 
industries and the bottom (top) four industries with lowest (high- 
est) mutual fund demand among the winners (losers) are labeled 
as low herding industries. The four industries that constitute the 
middle tertile based on the mutual fund demand are labeled as 
intermediate herding industries. We repeat the above analyses 
for the winner, loser and winner minus loser portfolios separately
for these three sub-categories: high herding, intermediate herding, 
and low herding. We also compute the difference between the high 
herding and low herding industries.38
The second to fourth columns of Panel A of Table 9 report the 
average raw returns of the loser, winner, and winner minus loser 
portfolios separately for the three herding groups: high herding, 
intermediate herding, and low herding industries. The last column 
reports the difference between high and low herding groups for 
these portfolios. In Panels B and C, we report the CAPM and three 
factor alphas, respectively for these portfolios. As can be seen from 
the three panels of Table 9, for the high and intermediate herding 
industries winner minus loser portfolios earn positive and statisti- 
cally significant average raw returns, CAPM alphas, and three-fac- 
tor alphas. However, for the low herding industries there is no 
evidence of industry momentum - the average raw return, CAPM 
and three-factor alphas for this winner minus loser portfolio of 
low herding industries are not significantly different from zero. 
The difference between the average momentum returns of high 
herding and low herding industries is 0.41% and statistically signif- 
icant at the 5% level, and this difference is marginally significant 
after adjusting for market risk.39 This difference between momen- 
tum returns is mainly driven by the difference between the returns 
of winner industries. The difference between average returns of high 
herding and low herding winner portfolios is 0.35% and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. In contrast, there is no significant differ- 
ence between the returns of high herding and low herding loser 
industries. This indicates that winner industries with low mutual 
fund demand (low herding) during the formation period do not con- 
tinue to earn superior returns in the subsequent six months. In con- 
trast, winner industries that experience high mutual fund demand 
(high herding) during the last quarter of the formation period con- 
tinue to earn abnormal returns in the following six month period. 
These results are in support of hypothesis 5.40
We also explore the mutual fund demand in the subsequent 
quarter (first quarter of the holding period) for the winner and 
loser industries. These results are reported in Panel D of Table 9. 
We find no significant difference between the subsequent mutual 
fund demand for winner and loser industries as can be seen in 
the first column of Panel D. However, mutual fund demand for 
winner industries in the first quarter of the holding period is signif- 
icantly higher (lower) than that for loser industries with high (low) 
herding. This finding suggests that winner industries that experi- 
ence high (low) demand in the formation period continue to expe- 
rience higher (lower) demand than loser industries do in the first 
quarter of the holding period, consistent with the evidence of 
industry herding reported in Section 4.1.2.
To sum up, in this section we provide evidence that industry 
momentum in the first six months of the year after the formation 
period is mainly observed in industries that experience high herd­
ing (high mutual fund demand) during the formation period. There 
is no evidence of momentum in industries that experience low 
herding during the formation period. This difference between the 
momentum returns of high and low herding industries is primarily
driven by the difference between the subsequent returns of winner 
industries.
7. Conclusion
Using the LSV (1992) and the Sias (2004) herding measures this 
study documents that mutual funds engage in industry herding. 
Monte Carlo simulations provide strong evidence that observed 
levels of industry herding are significantly higher than what could 
be expected by chance. We further document that industry herding 
by mutual funds is not driven by fund flows or style investing and 
is not a manifestation of individual stock herding.
This study also comments on the relationship between mutual 
fund herding and the returns on the herded industries. We docu­
ment that industries that are bought by herding mutual funds out­
perform industries that are sold by herding mutual funds in the 
quarter in which herding takes place. We find no evidence of 
return reversals for these industries, indicating that mutual fund 
herding has no destabilizing effect on industry values. Finally, this 
paper makes a contribution to the vast momentum literature by 
showing that industry momentum in winner industries depends 
on the extent that mutual funds herd away or to these winner 
industries during the formation period.
The findings of this study also have important implications for 
both individual investors and institutional investors especially for 
the ones who implement industry strategies. These investors 
may benefit from incorporating the information that mutual funds 
herd in industries and that certain conditions are associated with 
such herding behavior into their industry strategies. The evidence 
provided in this paper is also important for the mutual fund inves­
tors as it suggests that actively managed mutual funds follow the 
crowd when they trade industries. This information would be valu­
able to fund investors especially if herding in industries affects 
fund performance and the tendency of funds to engage in such 
behavior is predictable.
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